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INTRODUCTION
Online retail spending topped $80 billion in 2005.1 Shopping
on the Internet has become increasingly routine, with an estimated
$18.6 billion spent online during the first six weeks of the 2005
holiday season alone.2 The rising popularity of online shopping
has captured the attention of savvy advertisers, striving to
capitalize on a virtually limitless mass of consumers. However,
advertisers need the assistance of technology to showcase their

1
Press Release, JupiterResearch, JupiterResearch Forecasts Online Retail Spending
Will Reach $144 Billion in 2010, a CAGR of 12% from 2005, JUPITERMEDIA.COM, Feb. 6,
2006, http://www.jupitermedia.com/corporate/releases/06.02.06-newjupresearch.html.
2
Diane Anderson, Online Gift Shopping Up 16% This Year, ADWEEK.COM, Dec. 21,
2005,
http://www.adweek.com/aw/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1001736210.
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Internet ads to the relevant customer base.3 For example, if a Web
user is searching for sneakers, a company such as Nike may want
to immediately target that specific user with one of its ads, as
opposed to posting advertisements randomly or in bulk.
Fortunately, contextual advertising4 systems enable companies to
do just that: recognize what a Web user is interested in, and deliver
targeted advertisements based upon that interest.
Online contextual advertising is possible via the innovations of
companies like WhenU, Inc.5 and Google, Inc.6 By scanning the
text of a webpage or the keywords typed into a search engine,7 a
contextual advertising system can return targeted ads based upon
such content.8 Therefore, Nike is able to deliver a targeted
advertisement for, say, a new running shoe to a user viewing the
Adidas website. The consumer is now offered a choice between
competing brands, just as any department store patron would when
perusing the sportswear section. However, trademark law is being
used to prevent the online customer from ever seeing such
competing advertisements.9 This creates an unsettling paradox
between what is legal online versus offline, and raises the
following question: Should the legality of advertising depend upon
on the underlying medium?
This note explores the unsettled law surrounding the legality of
online contextual advertising and illustrates why it is important for
courts to avoid adapting jurisprudence to the Internet in a way that
establishes different standards for online and offline advertising.
Part I discusses contextual advertising and some of the
technologies that implement such advertising online, Part II
3

See Note, Confusion in Cyberspace: Defending and Recalibrating the Initial Interest
Confusion Doctrine, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2387 (2004) (discussing the necessity of
targeting the appropriate customer base in order to reap the benefits of the online
audience, and the use of new marketing applications to do so).
4
See infra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
5
See infra Part I.B.
6
See infra Part I.A.
7
See infra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
8
Shari Thurow, Contextual Advertising: Facts, Myths, And Misconceptions – Part 1,
Feb.
9,
2005,
http://www.webpronews.com/ebusiness/
WEBPRONEWS.COM,
ebusinesstactics/wpn-8-20050209ContextualAdvertisingFactsMythsandMisconceptions
Part1.html.
9
See infra Part II.B-C.
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summarizes the applicable trademark law jurisprudence and how it
is being used to render online contextual advertising illegal, and
Part III illustrates why enforcing different standards for online and
offline advertising is adverse to the goals of trademark law.
I. CONTEXTUAL ADVERTISING VIA SEARCH ENGINES AND POP-UPS
When customers shop for a particular item, they rarely enter a
store with only one brand to choose from. Alternatives abound,
with choices between brands conveniently placed nearby for quick
comparison.
For example, a customer entering a Macy’s
department store to purchase Nike sneakers may also see Adidas
and other competitors on the same shelf. Such commonplace
examples of fair competition are replicated for the online consumer
through contextual advertising.
Contextual advertising refers to ads, displayed to a user
browsing the Web, that are related to the contents of the current
webpage.10 Suppose a user is searching for available flights.
Based on the words or other contents of that page, a program may
deliver an ad describing another airline’s last minute flight
discounts.11 Hence, the ad is contextual because it is targeted to
the subject matter (“context”) of the webpage.12 Contextual
advertising is commonly implemented via search engines13 or popups.14

10

Danny Sullivan, Google Throws Hat into the Contextual Advertising Ring,
SEARCHENGINEWATCH.COM, Mar. 4, 2003, http://searchenginewatch.com/sereport/
article.php/2183531.
11
See id.
12
See id.
13
See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Search engines are websites that allow users to find information on the Internet. Id.
Google, Inc. operates a popular search engine at http://www.google.com.
14
Id. at 476 n.18 (describing Pop-ups as “windows containing notifications or
advertisements that appear on the screen, usually without any triggering action by the
computer user”).
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A. Search Engines and Keyed Banner Advertisements
With a search engine, a Web user can enter keywords to
generate a list of related webpages.15 The keywords can be generic
(e.g. “sneaker”) or a trademark (e.g. “Nike”).16 Because website
owners have limited control over their placement on a search
results page,17 search engines operated by Google and Netscape
Communications Corp. (“Netscape”) have generated significant
revenue by selling advertisements “keyed” to certain keywords.18
For example, Adidas may pay Google to have its advertisement
displayed when a user enters the keyword “Nike.” The Web user
is now presented with online sportswear alternatives that are
comparable to those found in a typical brick-and-mortar19
department store.
Keyed advertisements on a search engine results page are
usually in the form of “banner ads.”20 Banner ads are on the top or
side of the query results, distinguishing them from the user’s
ordinary results list.21 The ordinary results, accordingly, may
include the Nike website and other sites selling Nike apparel, while
a banner ad for Adidas appears off to the right. This simulates inperson shopping because, analogizing the Web to one gigantic
shopping mall, any consumer searching for a product may be
15

Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 691 (6th
Cir. 2003). “[S]earch engines work by comparing search terms entered by the Internet
user with databases of websites maintained by the search engine, generating a results
page that lists the websites matching the search term.” Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v.
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 (E.D. Va. 2004).
16
Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
17
See Interactive Prods. Corp., 326 F.3d at 691–92 (“Each search engine uses its own
algorithm to search for and arrange web pages in sequence, so the list of web pages . . .
may differ depending on the search engine used. Search engines usually look for
keywords in places such as domain names, actual text . . . , and metatags.”) (citations
omitted).
18
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1022–23 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“Keying allows [companies] to target individuals with certain interests by
linking advertisements to pre-identified terms. . . . After paying a fee . . . , [companies]
could have [their] advertisements appear on the page listing the search results. . . .”).
19
“Brick-and-mortar” is a term used to distinguish a traditional “street-side” business
at
with
its
online
counterpart.
See,
e.g.,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brickandmortar.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
20
Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1023.
21
See id.
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tempted by competing alternatives despite an initial interest in
seeking a specific brand.
B. Contextual Pop-up Advertisements
Most computer users are probably familiar with the Microsoft
Windows operating system. After launching a program such as an
Internet browser or word processor, a “window” appears that
encapsulates that program.22 Separate windows can be open at the
same time, allowing multiple applications to run simultaneously.23
A pop-up is simply one of these windows and may display an
advertisement over or underneath other windows.24
Companies like Claria Corp.25 and WhenU, Inc. develop
software that implement contextual advertising via pop-ups.26
Claria “operates a software-based advertising network called the
[GAIN] Network.”27 Through the GAIN Network, Claria “sees
consumer behavior in real-time” and delivers “contextually
relevant” pop-up advertisements.28 Many of these pop-ups are
advertisements from competitors of the website a user is currently
viewing.29 For example, the GAIN Network can observe a user
visiting the Hertz car rental website and immediately deliver a popup ad from another car rental company such as Alamo.30

22

1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
See id.
24
See id. at 478 (describing different ads generated by SaveNow software, including
pop-ups that are over other windows, and pop-unders which appear behind the webpage
visited).
25
See, e.g., CLARIA.COM, http://www.claria.com/companyinfo (last visited Apr. 10,
2005). Claria was previously known as Gator.
26
See generally Jason A. Cody, Just Whenu Thought It was All Over, Gator’s Kin Pops
Up and Slides Out of Dangerous IP Waters (for the Most Part): A Review of 2 Online
Pop-Up Advertisers and 4 Internet Law Decisions, 7 PGH J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3 (2004)
(discussing Gator and WhenU’s dominance in the online pop-up advertising industry).
27
Hertz Corp. v. The Gator Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423 (D.N.J. 2003) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
28
CLARIA.COM, http://www.claria.com/advertise (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
29
GAINPUBLISHING.COM, http://www.gainpublishing.com/global/about (last visited
Apr. 10, 2005).
30
See Hertz Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
23
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Similarly, WhenU delivers contextual pop-up advertisements
through its SaveNow software.31 A computer user with SaveNow
will receive targeted pop-up ads based on the Web address of the
current webpage, the overall content of the webpage, or keywords
typed into a search engine.32 SaveNow chooses which category of
advertisements to send by comparing the above data with a
“directory of commonly used search phrases, commonly visited
Web addresses, and various keyword algorithms”33 Once a user
receives a pop-up from either Claria or WhenU software, users
typically must stop their current browsing activity and either click
on the ad or close its window.34 The analogous in-person shopping
experience is simply deciding whether or not to visit the
competitor’s display.
II. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE LEGALITY OF CONTEXTUAL
ADVERTISING
Trademark law has been a weapon of choice for plaintiffs who
want to prevent a Web user from viewing a competitor’s
contextual banner or pop-up advertisements.35
A. Trademark Law Overview
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof” used to indicate the source of a good.36
Trademark law, codified in the Lanham Act,37 is a subset of unfair

31

U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D. Va. 2003).
WHENU.COM, at http://www.whenu.com/products_savenow_help.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2005).
33
U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
34
See Geoffrey D. Wilson, Internet Pop-Up Ads: Your Days are Numbered!: The
Supreme Court of California Announces a Workable Standard for Trespass to Chattels in
Electronic Communications, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 567, 570 (2004) (“When a popup ad pops up, users are forced to stop whatever they are doing and close the newly
created browser window.”).
35
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding Netscape’s keyed advertising program may infringe upon Playboy’s
registered trademarks).
36
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2005).
37
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000).
32
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competition law.38 It “secure[s] to the owner of [a] mark the
goodwill of his business and . . . protect[s] the ability of consumers
to distinguish among competing producers.”39 In other words, the
Lanham Act “protect[s] consumers who have formed particular
associations with a mark from buying a competing product using
the same or substantially similar mark and to allow the mark
holder to distinguish his product from that of his rivals.”40
Therefore, a relatively unknown athletic apparel manufacturer
cannot boost sales by marking his products with a “Swoosh”
symbol substantially similar to that associated with Nike.41
Contextual advertising is commonly attacked on trademark
infringement and unfair competition grounds.42 Section 32 of the
Lanham Act governs trademark infringement and proscribes the
“use in commerce [of] any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion.”43 Unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Act provides
essentially the same protection to unregistered trademarks that § 32

38

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003).
Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (citation omitted).
40
Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 2005).
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark,
reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, for
it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item - the item with
this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that
he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial,
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.
Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (1999) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
41
See Bosley Med. Inst., 403 F.3d at 679 (“Trademark laws are intended to protect
consumers from purchasing the products of an infringer [because of] the mistaken
assumption that they are buying a product produced or sponsored by [the trademark
holder].”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
42
See, e.g., U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va.
2003). The court described the case as involving “pop-up advertising and Plaintiff UHaul’s claim that Defendant WhenU’s pop-up advertising infringes upon U-Haul’s
trademark . . . and amounts to unfair competition.” Id. at 724.
43
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (emphasis added).
39
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guarantees registered trademarks.44 Consequently, courts have
interpreted the above provisions as requiring a plaintiff to prove:
(1) that it possesses a mark, (2) that the defendant used the
mark, (3) that the defendant’s use of the mark occurred in
commerce, (4) that the defendant used the mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services, and (5) that the defendant
used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers.45
The “use in commerce” and “likelihood of confusion”
requirements have proven to be the most controversial in
trademark cases involving contextual advertising.46
1. Use in Commerce Requirement
With respect to goods, a trademark is used in commerce when
it is “placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed
thereto.”47 The Lanham Act also specifies that a mark is used in
commerce in connection with services “when it is ‘used or
displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are
rendered in commerce.’”48 This requirement is essential, and the
Lanham Act clearly stipulates that non-commercial use of a
trademark is not actionable.49
2. Likelihood of Confusion and the Initial Interest Confusion
Doctrine
Once it can be shown that a defendant used plaintiff’s mark in
commerce, infringement is only found if such use is likely to
44

Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1046. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
provides a cause of action against a party who “uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . which . . . is likely to cause
confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection, or association [of that party’s] goods,
services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2000) (emphasis added).
45
U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
46
See infra Part II.B-C.
47
U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
48
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
49
Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(4)(B) (2000)).
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confuse “an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent
purchasers.”50 If the court finds that these purchasers are confused
regarding the source of the defendant’s goods or services, or
believe that they are sponsored or endorsed by the plaintiff’s mark,
the confusion is actionable.51 Courts apply multi-factor tests to
assess likelihood of confusion. These factors may include, but are
not limited to,52 (1) the strength of plaintiff’s mark, (2) similarity
of the marks, (3) proximity of the products, (4) likelihood the
plaintiff will “bridge the gap” between the products, (5) existence
of actual confusion, (6) sophistication of ordinarily prudent
purchasers, (7) bad faith, and (8) the quality of the defendant’s
products.53
Plaintiffs in online contextual advertising cases benefit from a
doctrine called “initial interest confusion.”54 In some Circuits,
actionable confusion is not limited to cases where purchasers are
confused as to source or sponsorship at the point of sale,55 but also
encompasses trademark use “calculated to capture initial consumer
attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a
result of the confusion. . . .”56
In the landmark initial interest confusion case, Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corporation,
Brookfield Communications, Inc. (“Brookfield”) asserted
trademark infringement and unfair competition against West Coast
Entertainment Corp. (“West Coast”) for including the

50

1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
51
Id. at 490–91.
52
Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (1999)
(“[T]his eight-factor test for likelihood of confusion is pliant. Some factors are much
more important than others, and the relative importance of each individual factor will be
case-specific.”).
53
See Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 415, 430–34 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (discussing the Polaroid factors).
54
See infra Parts II.B.1, II.C.2.
55
1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 491. But see generally Wells Fargo & Co. v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (acknowledging that the 6th
Circuit has not recognized initial interest confusion).
56
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062 (internal quotation and citation
omitted).

HANDY

2006]

3/17/2006 11:04 AM

CONFUSION AND COMMERCIAL CHOICE ONLINE

577

“MovieBuff” trademark in its website metatags.57 Metatags
consist of hidden code that describes the contents of a webpage
and “serve as a cataloging system for a search engine.”58 Because
search engines use these metatags to generate query results, users
searching for “MovieBuff” would see both Brookfield’s and West
Coast’s websites in the query results list.59 To justify a finding of
infringement against West Coast, the court illustrated initial
interest confusion with the following analogy:
Using another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like
posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store.
Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts
up a billboard on a highway reading–”West Coast Video: 2 miles
ahead at Exit 7”–where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West
Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it.
Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right
by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even
consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the
trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there is a
Blockbuster right there. Customers are not confused in the narrow
sense: they are fully aware that they are purchasing from
Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is
related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast. Nevertheless,
the fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter
the fact that Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast’s
acquired goodwill.60
Similarly, the Second Circuit adopted initial interest confusion
in a case where Pegasus Petroleum Corp. (“Pegasus”) “gain[ed]
crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal” because third
parties mistakenly believed Pegasus was related to Mobil Oil
Corp.61 Plaintiffs alleging trademark infringement rely on this
argument in many banner and pop-up advertisement cases.62

57
58
59
60
61

See id. at 1061–62.
Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 n.3, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062.
Id. at 1064.
Mobile Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987).
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3. The Fair Use Exception
It is important to emphasize that the purpose of trademark law
is not to impede fair competition,63 but to ensure that trademark
owners benefit from the goodwill associated with their marks.64
Consequently, trademark law seeks to promote fair competition,
and recognizes legal uses of trademarks in commerce that do not
misappropriate such goodwill, despite evidence of likelihood of
confusion.65
Courts recognize two fair use defenses: “classic” and
“nominative.”66 Classic fair use applies when “a defendant has
used a plaintiff’s mark only to describe his own product, and not at
all to describe plaintiff’s product.”67 In other words, classic fair
use permits common words to be used in their dictionary sense

Judge MacMahon found a likelihood of confusion not in the fact that a third
party would do business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil,
but rather in the likelihood that Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial
credibility during the initial phases of a deal. For example, an oil trader might
listen to a cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum . . . when otherwise he
might not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil.
Id.
62

See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025
(9th Cir. 2004) (asserting users are likely to be initially confused by unlabeled banner
advertisements that appear after a search for Playboy trademarks); Google Inc. v.
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *7–*8 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (alleging Google’s AdWords advertising program intercepts
customers by causing them to click on competitor ads because of the false impression
such ads are associated with American Blind). Without initial interest confusion, a
plaintiff is forced to rely solely on point of sale confusion. In other words, a plaintiff must
prove that an online shopper who clicks on a competitor’s advertisement and is redirected
to a competing website will never realize the site is independent from the one originally
sought—even after a purchase is completed. Personal experience dictates the virtual
impossibility of satisfying such a burden.
63
Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword
Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 571–72 (2002-2003).
64
Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003).
65
See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542, 550
(2004) (holding that evidence of consumer confusion does not necessarily foreclose a fair
use defense).
66
Horphag Research Ltd., 337 F.3d at 1040.
67
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 809 (9th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis altered from original) (citation omitted).
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even if they are also trademarked.68 For example, a farmer using
the term “Apple” to describe his orchard cannot be held to infringe
Apple Computer, Inc.’s trademark.
On the other hand, defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark is
nominative if the use does describe the plaintiff’s product, but
“does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to
appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one.”69
Nominative fair use “acknowledges that it is often virtually
impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of
comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other such purpose
without using [plaintiff’s] mark.”70
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Terri Welles, Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. (“PEI”) objected to former Playboy Playmate
Terri Welles’ use of the title “Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981.”
However, regardless of whether visitors to Terri Welles’ website
believed that it was sponsored or endorsed by PEI, the nominative
fair use defense applied:
There is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe
herself and her services without venturing into absurd descriptive
phrases. To describe herself as the “nude model selected by Mr.
Hefner’s magazine as its number-one prototypical woman for the
year 1981” would be impractical as well as ineffectual in
identifying Terri Welles to the public.71
For a defendant to successfully assert a nominative fair use
defense, (1) “the product or service in question must be one not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark,” (2) “only so
much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary
to identify the product or service,” and (3) the plaintiff does
68

Horphag Research Ltd., 337 F.3d at 1041. (“The classic fair use defense ‘applies
only to marks that possess both a primary and a secondary meaning – and only when the
mark is used in its primary descriptive sense rather than its secondary trademark sense.’”
(quoting Brother Records, Inc., v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2003)).
69
Id.
70
Id. “It is well established that the Lanham Act does not prevent one from using a
competitor’s mark truthfully to identify the competitor’s goods, . . . or in comparative
advertisements.” Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1065 (1999) (citations omitted).
71
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing district
court’s holding with approval).
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“nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”72
B. Contextual Banner Advertisements Under Fire
As explained previously, search engine providers generate
revenue by displaying banner advertisements keyed to specific
terms.73 But, suppose Netscape or Google sells companies the
right to have their ads keyed to a trademark like “Dell” as opposed
to a generic keyword such as “laptop.” Should this constitute
trademark infringement? Is this a use in commerce likely to cause
confusion?
1. Brookfield Analogy Extended to Keyed Banner
Advertisements
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications, PEI
alleged trademark infringement against Netscape and Excite for
keying adult-oriented company banner ads to the trademarks
“playboy” and “playmate.”74 The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, finding
genuine issues of material fact regarding the trademark
infringement claims.75
The Ninth Circuit casually addressed the use in commerce
requirement in one sentence: “PEI clearly holds the marks in
question and defendants used the marks in commerce without
PEI’s permission.”76
Presumably, the court believed the
defendants committed actionable use in commerce by marketing
the keyed banner ads to PEI’s competitors, or by including the
trademarks in the algorithm used to trigger relevant contextual
banner ads.77
72

Id. at 802–03.
See supra Part I.A.
74
Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1022–23.
75
Id. at 1034. Playboy also alleged dilution, but the dilution claim is outside the scope
of this paper.
76
Id. at 1024.
77
According to the lower court, “Plaintiff has not shown that defendants use the terms
in their trademark form, i.e., Playboy(R) and Playmate(R), when marketing to advertisers
or in the algorithm that effectuates the keying of the ads to the keywords. Thus, plaintiff’s
73
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Having found defendants used PEI’s marks in commerce, the
court addressed the likelihood of confusion prerequisite for
infringement, focusing on an initial interest confusion theory.
According to PEI, because the competitor banner advertisements
appear immediately after users search for the terms “playboy” or
“playmate,” users will mistakenly believe that the banner ads are
sponsored by PEI.78 The court likened this case to Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corporation,
and found that consumers originally seeking PEI may be lured to
banner advertisements and simply remain on a competitor’s site
despite immediately realizing it is wholly unrelated.79 Despite
formally applying an eight-factor test to determine likelihood of
initial interest confusion, the issue was essentially decided on one
factor alone: evidence of actual confusion.80 As the Second Circuit
recently concluded,
[t]here can be no more positive or substantial proof of the
likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion.
Moreover, reason tells us that while very little proof of
actual confusion would be necessary to prove the likelihood
of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof
would be necessary to refute such proof.81
Therefore, because an expert study established evidence of
actual confusion, the court noted that this alone justified a reversal
of the lower court’s grant of summary judgment.82 It is important

argument that defendants ‘use’ plaintiff’s trademarks falls short.” Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073–74 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit likely adopted the same theory of use, holding that the marks were in
fact used in their trademark form.
78
Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1025.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1026–29.
81
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 459 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added)
(quoting World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489
(5th Cir. 1971)).
82
Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1026. The court also denied defendant’s fair use
defenses. The classic fair use defense was disposed of because outdated case law at the
time supported the court’s assertion that “[a] fair use may not be a confusing use.” As for
nominative fair use, the court held that defendants failed the first requirement: the
product or service must not be readily identifiable without the mark. Apparently, the
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to note that the court expressly limited its decision to unlabeled
banner advertisements that do not clearly identify their source.83 If
the banner advertisements were clearly labeled, perhaps by
expressly discounting affiliation with the entered search terms, the
majority suggests there may not be a likelihood of confusion.84
In a concurring opinion, Judge Berzon expressed concern about
the Brookfield initial interest confusion standard because it
suggests there could be trademark infringement even if the banner
advertisements were clearly labeled.85 Brookfield held that “by
using ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for ‘MovieBuff’ to its
website, [the defendant] improperly benefits from the goodwill that
[the plaintiff] developed in its mark.”86 However, if the question is
simply one of diversion, should Adidas, strategically having a
sneaker display near rival Nike, be liable to trademark
infringement as well? Judge Berzon addressed such a question
with the following analogy:
I walk into Macy’s and ask for the Calvin Klein section and am
directed upstairs to the second floor. Once I get to the second floor,
on my way to the Calvin Klein section, I notice a more
prominently displayed line of Charter Club clothes, Macy’s own
brand, designed to appeal to the same people attracted by the style
of Calvin Klein’s latest line of clothes. Let’s say I get diverted
from my goal of reaching the Calvin Klein section, the Charter
Club stuff looks good enough to me, and I purchase some Charter
Club shirts instead. Has Charter Club or Macy’s infringed Calvin
Klein’s trademark, simply by having another product more
prominently displayed before one reaches the Klein line?
Certainly not.87

court believed using other words besides Playboy’s marks was a suitable substitute for
triggering contextual, adult-oriented, banner advertisements. Id. at 1029–30.
83
See id. at 1025 n.16 (“Note that if a banner advertisement clearly identified its source
or, even better, overtly compared PEI products to the sponsor’s own, no confusion would
occur under PEI’s theory.”).
84
Id.
85
See generally id. at 1034–36 (Berzon, concurring).
86
Id. (Berzon, concurring) (emphasis added).
87
Id. at 1035 (Berzon, concurring).

HANDY

2006]

3/17/2006 11:04 AM

CONFUSION AND COMMERCIAL CHOICE ONLINE

583

Judge Berzon also found that the highway billboard analogy set
forth in Brookfield88 was inapplicable to the case at hand for two
reasons: (1) customers searching for PEI’s site were not explicitly
misdirected because they never actually saw the mark, and (2) the
trivial inconvenience of clicking the Web browser’s back button to
return to the search engine results pales in comparison to a driver
taking the wrong highway exit.89
2. Whom Does the Use In Commerce Confuse?
Google, Inc. has faced numerous lawsuits because of its keyed
banner advertising program, Adwords.90
In Government
Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc., Google moved to
dismiss
Government
Employees
Insurance
Company’s
(“GEICO’s”) allegation that Google’s use of the registered marks
“GEICO” and “GEICO DIRECT” to trigger contextual banner
advertisements constituted infringement.91
The motion was
denied, principally because Google was held to commit actionable
use in commerce of GEICO’s trademarks.92
With respect to services, a trademark is used in commerce
“when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services.”93 The court held that Google used GEICO’s marks in
commerce by “allowing advertisers to bid on the trademarks and
pay [Google] to be linked to the trademarks.”94 This reasoning
may satisfy the Lanham Act definition, but it suggested a puzzling
likelihood of confusion argument.
Presumably, because the court found trademark use in
commerce between Google and GEICO’s competitors, the
“ordinarily prudent purchaser” against whom likelihood of
confusion is assessed was not the Web user using the Google’s
88

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1036 (Berzon, concurring).
90
See generally Google’s Ad Words Under Attack—Overview Over the Pending
Lawsuit, http://www.linksandlaw.com/adwords-pendinglawsuits.htm (last visited Oct.
31, 2005) (providing a comprehensive overview of the development of domestic and
foreign lawsuits against Google).
91
Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 (E.D. Va. 2004).
92
Id. at 704.
93
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
94
Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
89
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search engine, but rather the GEICO competitors who purchased
the right to have their ads keyed to GEICO’s marks. Specifically,
the court held that “[Google’s] offer of [GEICO’s] trademarks for
use in advertising could falsely identify a business relationship or
licensing agreement between [Google] and [GEICO].”95 Common
sense may dictate that such confusion would never arise because it
is difficult to comprehend why GEICO would ever encourage
competition against itself. The court skirts the issue by simply
stating that likelihood of confusion is fact-specific and not properly
resolved through a motion to dismiss.
After GEICO subsequently moved for judgment as a matter of
law, the court’s analysis demonstrated that likelihood of confusion
may be evaluated from the perspective of anyone using Google’s
search engine, not just the parties who were the targets of the
trademark use in commerce.96 The court evaluated survey
evidence that measured whether potential GEICO customers who
searched for “GEICO” using Google’s search engine mistakenly
believed that the keyed banner ads were linked to or affiliated with
GEICO’s website.97 Google prevailed only because of the court’s
doubts about the reliability of GEICO’s survey methodology.98
What is striking is that the answer to the question “Whom does
the use in commerce confuse?” is anyone. Once the court found
trademark use in commerce by virtue of Google’s sale of GEICO’s
trademarks to trigger competitor advertisements, the likelihood of
confusion analysis was completely unrelated to that transaction.
Instead, the focus was on the everyday consumer searching for
insurance, not the competitors who “could falsely identify a

95

Id.
See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18642, at
*17–*20 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (describing GEICO’s survey evidence which evaluated
the likelihood of confusion of ordinary Web users searching for “GEICO” on Google’s
search engine).
97
Id. at *19–*20.
98
Id. at *20–*25. Although not pertinent to this paper, GEICO’s survey evidence was
sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion for those Google banner ads that included
the trademark “GEICO” in its text or heading. Id. at *26.
96
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business relationship or licensing agreement between [Google] and
[GEICO].”99
C. WhenU Temporarily Banned in New York, Always Popping in
Virginia and Michigan
Pop-up and banner advertisements use keywords, including
trademarks, to trigger a contextual advertisement. The only
significant difference is that the former is displayed alongside
search engine query results, and the latter in a separate window.100
However, while the use in commerce requirement was not
carefully scrutinized in the banner ad cases, two district courts
found that WhenU’s pop-up technology did not involve actionable
use in commerce.101
1. U-Haul and Wells Fargo Fail to Demonstrate Use in
Commerce
In U-Haul International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., U-Haul
alleged WhenU’s use of U-Haul’s uniform resource locator
(“URL”)102 and trademark “U-Haul” in the SaveNow program
constituted trademark infringement.103 U-Haul argued that the
SaveNow software used U-Haul trademarks in commerce by (1)
displaying pop-up ads on the same computer screen as U-Haul’s
99

See supra note 94 and accompanying text. This is also consistent with the analysis in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications where use in commerce was
found because Netscape sold banner ads keyed to Playboy’s trademarks, see supra note
77 and accompanying text, and the likelihood of confusion analysis focused on
consumers searching for Playboy who were not aware of the trademark use in commerce.
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
100
See supra Part I.A–B.
101
See generally U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va.
2003) “[T]he appearance of WhenU’s ads on a user’s computer screen at the same time
as the U-Haul web page is a result of how applications operate in the Windows
environment and does not consist ‘use’ pursuant to the Lanham Act.” Id. at 728; Wells
Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) “WhenU does
not use any of plaintiffs’ trademarks to identify goods or services, to indicate any
sponsorship or affiliation with the goods or services advertised by WhenU, or to identify
the source or origin of any goods or services advertised by WhenU.” Id. at 747.
102
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740–41 (E.D. Mich.
2003). A webpage is identified by a unique URL, which usually incorporates the name
or trademark of the website owner.
103
U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 724.
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website and logo, and (2) incorporating U-Haul’s URL and
trademark in the SaveNow program.104
In response to plaintiff’s first use in commerce argument, the
court noted that WhenU pop-ups open in a “WhenU-branded
window” that is “separate and distinct” from the U-Haul website
window.105 A pop-up advertisement does not incorporate the
entire screen as a “single visual presentation” simply because the
pop-up advertisement and U-Haul website windows are
simultaneously visible.106 The court distinguished “framing,”
which occurs when a single window displays the contents of
multiple, distinct webpages,107 as being inapposite.108
Furthermore, the court emphasized that trademark use is not
established merely because marks are simultaneously visible.109
The court considered WhenU’s contextual pop-up advertisements
as being tantamount to comparative advertising,110 which
nominative fair use clearly permits.111
The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that WhenU’s
inclusion of the U-Haul trademark and URL in the SaveNow
directory constituted actionable use in commerce.112 Unlike
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc., any use in
commerce resulting from the sale of contextual ads to plaintiff’s
competitors was not considered. Instead, the court focused on the
computer user who simultaneously views both the U-Haul website
and the pop-up ad. Because “U-Haul fails to adduce any evidence
that WhenU uses U-Haul’s trademarks to identify the source of its
goods or services,” the court held that there is no use in commerce
as defined by the Lanham Act.113 Rather, WhenU “merely uses the
104

Id. at 727. Defendant also argued the pop-up ads interfered with the use of U-Haul’s
Web page and, therefore, constituted use in commerce. Id. at 728. For purposes of this
paper, this argument need not be addressed.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 727–28.
107
Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 748.
108
U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727.
109
Id. at 728.
110
Id.
111
See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
112
U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 3d at 728.
113
Id.
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marks for the ‘pure machine linking function’ and in no way
advertises or promotes U-Haul’s Web address or any other U-Haul
trademark.”114
Because U-Haul was unable to show that WhenU used its
marks in commerce, it would have been superfluous to address any
likelihood of confusion arguments. However, after disposing of
the use in commerce argument in similar fashion,115 the court in
Wells Fargo & Co. noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
likelihood of confusion.116 Because the Sixth Circuit does not
recognize the initial interest confusion doctrine, plaintiffs’ only
recourse was to prove point of sale confusion.117 In other words,
plaintiffs had to prove that users clicking an Adidas pop-up ad and
purchasing sneakers at the Adidas website believed that the
sneakers were endorsed or sponsored by the Nike website they
were originally viewing. Given the implausible prospect of this
scenario, it is not surprising that the court found plaintiffs’
evidence unpersuasive.118
2. Southern District of New York Finds Hidden Use in
Commerce
After two successive court victories, WhenU’s luck seemed to
run out in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com.119 Judge Batts
granted 1-800 Contacts’ motion for a preliminary injunction to
enjoin WhenU from using “1800contacts.com” to trigger

114

Id. (emphasis added).
The court in Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc. emphasized that “[t]he
inclusion of web addresses in WhenU’s proprietary [d]irectory is done to identify the
category the participating consumer is interested in, such as mortgages, and it dispatch a
contextually relevant advertisement to that consumer.” 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 762 (E.D.
Mich. 2003)(emphasis added).
116
Id. at 764 (“Although the Court’s holding that [WhenU] has not impermissibly used
plaintiffs’ marks makes it unnecessary to reach the issue of confusion, plaintiffs’ failure
to establish this element of their claim further weakens their request for injunctive
relief.”).
117
Id.
118
See id. at 765.
119
See generally 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (granting 1-800 Contacts’ motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin WhenU
from delivering competitive pop-up ads).
115
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contextual pop-up advertisements.120 The court found that WhenU
used 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks in commerce, and such use was
likely to cause initial interest confusion.121
According to Judge Batts, 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks were
used in commerce in two ways. “First, [by] causing pop-up
advertisements for [] Vision Direct to appear when SaveNow
users have specifically attempted to access Plaintiff’s website – on
which Plaintiff’s trademark appears[,] Defendants are displaying
Plaintiff’s mark ‘in the . . . advertising of’ . . . Vision Direct’s
services.”122 This is in stark contrast to the reasoning in U-Haul
International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. where the court held that
trademark use is not established simply because marks are
simultaneously visible, and a pop-up advertisement does not
incorporate the entire computer screen as a “single visual
presentation.”123 Essentially, Judge Batts held that the defendants
used plaintiff’s mark because the pop-up advertisement was visible
alongside plaintiff’s trademark on the 1-800 Contacts website.
Second, the court held that WhenU used plaintiff’s mark to
advertise and publicize plaintiff’s competitors by including
“1800contacts.com” in SaveNow’s directory of terms.124
Therefore, a “pure machine linking function” in the previous
WhenU cases was unexpectedly actionable use in commerce
according to Judge Batts in the Southern District of New York.125
This finding implies that the court believes an ordinarily prudent
purchaser is likely to be confused by trademark use in commerce

120

Id. at 510.
Id. at 508. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Second Circuit recognizes initial interest
confusion. See Mobile Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir.
1987) (“Likelihood of confusion [is found] not in the fact that a third party would do
business with [defendant] believing it related to [plaintiff], but rather in the likelihood
that [defendant] would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal.”).
122
1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489 (emphasis added).
123
See infra notes 101–07 and accompanying text. The court explicitly stated that it
disagrees with the Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc. and U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v.
When.com, Inc. cases and is not bound by them. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at
490 n.43.
124
1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
125
See supra Part II.C.1
121
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even though he or she is not cognizant of its use.126 In fact, Judge
Batts states unequivocally that actionable use in commerce does
not require that the trademark identify the source of a good or
service.127
After finding use in commerce, Judge Batts found that initial
interest confusion occurs when potential 1-800 Contacts customers
are “diverted and distracted” to Vision Direct’s website.128 The
court held that by triggering pop-ups at the same time a user visits
the 1-800 Contacts website, Vision Direct misappropriates 1-800
Contacts’ goodwill by gaining “crucial credibility during the initial
phases of the deal.”129 To assess the likelihood of initial interest
confusion, the court examined the same multi-factor test it uses for
point of sale confusion: the Polaroid factors.130
The court analyzed some Polaroid factors that are of
questionable probative value for assessing likelihood of initial
interest confusion with respect to pop-ups. For example, the court
held that the “strength of the plaintiff’s mark,” favors 1-800
Contacts because its trademark is “suggestive” and, therefore,
inherently distinctive.131 However, given that (1) users explicitly
126

The court goes on to belittle the notion that trademark use in commerce must be
visible: “[WhenU] is doing far more than merely ‘displaying’ Plaintiff’s mark. WhenU’s
advertisements are delivered to a SaveNow user when the user directly accesses
Plaintiff’s website . . . allowing Defendant . . . to profit from the goodwill and reputation
in Plaintiff’s website that led the user to access Plaintiff’s website in the first place.” 1800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 490. This is also consistent with the analysis in
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc. and Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Netscape Communications where each court found actionable trademark use in
commerce involving plaintiff’s competitors, but analyzed likelihood of confusion with
respect to potential customers who were never privy to the trademark use in question. See
supra Part II.B.2, notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
127
1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489.
128
See id. at 493 (“[O]n the Internet, initial interest confusion occurs when ‘potential
consumers of one website will be diverted and distracted to a competing website.’”).
129
Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir.
1987)).
130
See id. at 494 (applying the traditional eight-factor test to determine likelihood of
confusion as set forth by Judge Friendly in Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp. to
assess the newer doctrine of initial interest confusion).
131
Id. at 496. The “strength of plaintiff’s mark” factor focuses on the mark’s tendency
to identify goods as originating from a specific source. Id. at 495. Courts evaluate both
the mark’s inherent distinctiveness and its distinctiveness in the marketplace. Id. at 496–
97. Ordered from least inherently distinctive to most inherently distinctive, courts use
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enter the URL for the 1-800 Contacts website into their browser
before seeing the Vision Direct pop-up, (2) the Vision Direct popup does not incorporate any of 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks, and (3)
the only issue is whether users believe the pop-up is endorsed or
sponsored by the website triggering the pop-up, the strength of
plaintiff’s mark is irrelevant. Plaintiff’s case depends upon the
timing of the pop-up, not its actual contents.132 Hence, the mark’s
distinctiveness, inherent or acquired in the marketplace, does
nothing to buttress plaintiff’s argument.
Another Polaroid factor of minimal probative value is the
“similarity of the marks.”133Here, the court compares the keyword
“www.1800Contacts.com” located in SaveNow’s hidden directory
with plaintiff’s trademark “1-800 CONTACTS.” According to
Judge Batts, “If Defendants used a mark less similar to Plaintiff’s
mark—for example, ‘www.contacts.com’—then a SaveNow user
who received Defendants’ pop-up advertisements after typing into
a browser ‘www.contacts.com’ would be less likely to associate
Plaintiff’s mark with Defendants’ pop-up advertisements.” If
SaveNow used a different Web address in its directory of terms, no
pop-ups would appear when a user visited 1-800 Contacts’
website. The court’s reasoning appears to simply reiterate how the
SaveNow program triggers contextual ads.

four categories to describe a mark: (1) “generic”—common description of goods that
does not qualify for trademark protection, (2) “descriptive”—describes a products
features and only is afforded trademark protection if it acquires secondary meaning, (3)
“suggestive”—only suggests the features of a product so that consumers must use their
imagination to determine the nature of the goods, and (4) “fanciful or arbitrary”—
completely invented word that receives the highest level of trademark protection. Id. at
495.
132
Cf. id. at 489 (“[B]y causing pop-up advertisements to appear when SaveNow users
have specifically attempted to find or access Plaintiff’s website, Defendants are ‘using’
Plaintiff’s marks that appear on Plaintiff’s website.”).
133
Polaroid, 287 2d at 495. Judge Batts acknowledged that this factor traditionally
contemplates the consumer actually seeing the trademarks. 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp.
2d at 496 n.53. However, applying Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West coast
Entertainment Corp., the court holds that “the issue is not whether the WhenU or Vision
Direct marks themselves are similar to the Plaintiff’s marks, but whether the marks used
by the Defendants (whether actually seen by the consumer or not) are so similar to
Plaintiff’s mark that [the] similarity could ultimately cause consumer confusion.” Id. at
496 n.53.
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Some of the other factors that the court examines are more
probative. For example, “proximity of the parties’ services” is
clearly probative and weighs in favor of the plaintiff. Because
both plaintiff and defendant sell replacement contact lenses to
consumers, a consumer is more likely to erroneously believe
Visual Direct’s pop-up advertisements are generated by 1-800
Contacts. Also, “existence of actual confusion between the marks”
would obviously be probative because there is no better way to
prove the likelihood of confusion than with evidence that it really
occurs.134
Before ultimately concluding that the Polaroid factors
demonstrate a likelihood of initial interest confusion, the court
dismissed WhenU’s branding argument.135 WhenU’s pop-up
windows had a green “$” mark and the text “SaveNow” across the
top.136 Also, a “?” symbol in the upper right-hand corner opened
another window explaining what SaveNow software was, and the
bottom right read “A WhenU offer—click ? for info.”137 WhenU
argued that such clearly labeled pop-up ads should not confuse
consumers. Judge Batts, despite acknowledging that disclaimers
can substantially avoid the risk of consumer confusion, discounted
WhenU’s disclaimers as being completely ineffectual.138 In fact,
Judge Batts suggested that disclaimers are per se ineffective at
mitigating initial interest confusion: “Even if Defendants had
offered evidence of the effect of its branding and disclaimers, such
evidence would do little to counter Plaintiff’s showing of the
likelihood of initial interest confusion.”139 Such reasoning could
effectually force contextual pop-up ad companies like WhenU and
Claria out of business. This opinion arguably reflects the adoption
of a creative, albeit deviant, interpretation of the Lanham Act to

134

See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
136
Id. at 503.
137
Id. The court disregards additional WhenU branding implemented subsequent to the
filing of 1-800 Contact’s lawsuit. Id. at 478 n.23.
138
Id. at 504 (“[C]onsumer confusion caused by the pop-up advertisements can hardly
be alleviated by WhenU’s use of disclaimers with terms that are buried in other web
pages, requiring viewers to scroll down or click on a link.”).
139
Id.
135
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advance the policy that pop-up ads are annoying and should be
illegal.140
3. Second Circuit Plays Dumb—Cannot Find Trademarks
The Second Circuit reversed the Southern District, dismissing
1-800 Contacts’ trademark infringement claims.141 Unfortunately,
the court balked at an opportunity to specifically address Judge
Batts’ assertion that actionable trademark use does not require a
source-identifying component, and instead chose to dismiss the
issue by holding no trademarks were used, commercial or
otherwise, by WhenU.142 According to the Second Circuit,
WhenU’s SaveNow directory does not use 1-800 Contacts’
trademarks, but rather only uses the company’s website address.143
The addition of the “www” and “.com” to 1-800 Contacts’
trademark “transform[s] 1-800’s trademark—which is entitled to
protection under the Lanham Act—to a word combination that
functions more or less like a public key to 1-800’s website.”144
The Second Circuit even suggested that the similarity between 1800 Contacts’ trademark and its website address was mere
“happenstance,”145 as if companies fail to recognize that Web users
“often assume, as a rule of thumb, that the domain name of a
particular company will be the company name followed by
‘.com’”146. Such reasoning clashes with a long line of cases that

140

See, e.g., Geoffrey D. Wilson, Internet Pop-Up Ads: Your Days are Numbered!: The
Supreme Court of California Announces a Workable Standard for Trespass to Chattels in
Electronic Communications, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 567, 571–72 (2004) (providing a
list of online articles that illustrate the public’s disdain for pop-ups).
141
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 440 F.3d 400, 413 (2d Cir. 2005).
142
See Id. at 409 (emphasizing the difference between using 1-800 Contacts’ Web site
address in WhenU’s directory and using the 1-800 Contacts’ trademark itself).
143
Id. at 408–09.
144
Id. The Second Circuit also explicitly limited the scope of its decision, holding that
“in order for WhenU to capitalize on the fame and recognition of 1-800’s trademark . . . it
would have needed to put the actual trademark on the list.” Id.
145
Id. at 410.
146
Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (1999)
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recognize the source identification function of domain names
incorporating trademarks.147
The Second Circuit also reversed the Southern District’s
finding that WhenU used 1-800 Contacts’ trademark by virtue of
its contemporaneous placement with the 1-800 Contacts website.148
Again, the Second Circuit’s reversal is contingent upon its
reasoning that WhenU’s pop-ups are triggered by 1-800 Contacts’
website address, not its trademark.149 According to the court, “the
contemporaneous display of the [pop-up and 1-800 Contacts’
website] is the result of the happenstance that 1-800 chose to use a
mark similar to its trademark as the address to its web page.”
Such a questionable distinction between a trademark and a
domain name that incorporates the trademark highlights the fact
that the Second Circuit painstakingly tried to limit its holding to
the pop-up cases without interfering with those addressing banner
ads.150 In doing so, the holding focuses more on the specific
technology of pop-ups rather than the discordant use in commerce
interpretations in the district court cases reviewed above.151
Therefore, the Southern District’s general analysis can continue to
be endorsed by other courts addressing the legality of contextual
banner ads.152

147

See, e.g., Paccar Inc. v. Telescan Technologies, L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing a series of cases that recognize that domain names can identify the source or
sponsorship of a website and are worthy of Lanham Act protection)
148
1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 410.
149
Id.
150
The Second Circuit unequivocally stated that its opinion does not address whether or
not the inclusion of the actual 1-800 Contacts trademark in the SaveNow directory would
constitute an infringing trademark use. Id. at 409 n.11.
151
See supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.
152
See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Va.
2004) (finding Judge Batts’ decision in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com “better
reasoned” than the U-Haul and Wells Fargo cases); see also Google Inc. v. American
Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005)
(denying Google’s motion to dismiss trademark infringement claims because its Adwords
program does not use American Blind’s trademarks in commerce, noting its approach is
consistent with that taken by the Eastern District of Virginia in Government Employees
Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc.).
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III. WHY THE INITIALLY CONFUSED SHOULD GET A CLUE
The Internet is a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide
human communication. The parties and the Court are conversant
with the workings of the Internet, as well as with the constantly
expanding body of law that seeks to craft a legal contour for it.
The Court is mindful of the difficulty of applying well-established
doctrines to what can only be described as an amorphous situs of
information, anonymous messenger of communication, and
seemingly endless stream of commerce. Indeed, the very vastness,
and manipulability, of the Internet forms the mainspring of
plaintiff’s lawsuit.153
The above cases illustrate the judiciary’s attempt to reconcile
the new technology of the Internet with longstanding legal
doctrines. However, if what is legal in brick-and-mortar is made
illegal online, perhaps courts have inadvertently changed, rather
than adapted, jurisprudence in response to new technologies.

A. The Danger of Liberal Findings of Trademark Use in
Commerce
The Lanham Act clearly states that liability results from the
“use in commerce” of a mark that “is likely to cause confusion.”154
The first two WhenU cases discussed interpreted use in commerce
as requiring trademark use that identifies the source of goods or
services. If the ordinarily prudent purchaser, as a result of such
source identifying use, is likely to be confused regarding the true
origin of the good or service, trademark infringement is found,
barring a proper fair use defense.155 Judge Batts in 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com disagreed, finding actionable use in
commerce that not only lacked a source identifying function, but
was not even cognizable to the ordinarily prudent purchaser.156

153

Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073–74
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
154
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
155
See supra Part II.C.1.
156
See supra Part II.C.2.
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Recall Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Netscape Communications where she analogized Netscape’s
banner advertisements to a Macy’s department store customer
faced with choices between competing brands.157 If it could be
shown that Charter Club selected its display location by noting
where the Calvin Klein display was, in other words by “using” the
Calvin Klein trademark to position itself nearby, would that
constitute actionable use in commerce?158 Charter Club does not
feature the Calvin Klein logo on any of its clothing or displays.
But, use in commerce may be found by virtue of its strategic
placement near Calvin Klein, and consumers see both brands
simultaneously.159 Now, the only prerequisite left for infringement
is proving likelihood of confusion, and only a minimal amount of
evidence demonstrating actual confusion is required to do so.160
Therefore, should trademark law ever require Charter Club to
select floor space based only on the generic department (e.g. men’s
clothing), and remain completely ignorant of the precise locales of
specific brands? Certainly not.
The above scenario illustrates how irrationally a liberal use in
commerce doctrine transcribes to the brick-and-mortar world and
why non-source identifying use in commerce is unique to the
Internet. From a policy standpoint, having different standards for
what constitutes use in commerce online versus offline does not
promote the fundamental goals of the Lanham Act because it does
nothing to “protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among
competing producers.”161 In fact, this harms rather than protects
consumers because it deprives them of the right to see competing
producers at all.
157

See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
C.f. supra Part II.C.2 (finding trademark use because Vision Direct used 1-800
Contacts’ trademark to launch its advertisement alongside the 1-800 Contacts webpage).
159
C.f. supra note 122 and accompanying text (finding trademark use because Vision
Direct’s advertisement appears alongside the 1-800 Contacts website “on which [its]
trademark appears”).
160
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Just as search engine users may not
understand the difference between normal query results and paid advertising and assume
one is sponsored or endorsed by the other, see infra note 145, Macy’s customers might
mistakenly believe that Charter Club is another brand name distributed under Calvin
Klein’s parent company, Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation.
161
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
158
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If use in commerce does not even have to identify or
distinguish products or services, then such use can be found in
virtually every software program that maps brands to product
categories. Any court with the patience to read source-code can
find use in commerce, effectively eliminating it as a prerequisite
for infringement. Under such a scenario, the initially confused
really must get a clue because their ignorance can single-handedly
determine whether a defendant is liable for trademark infringement
or unfair competition.162
B. What About Fair Use?
Trademark use that is embedded within a program to trigger
contextual advertisements does not satisfy the requirements of
either classic or nominative fair use.163 Such use does not qualify
as classic fair use because the trademarks are used within hidden
software code to map brands to general product or service
categories, not to describe the overall software itself,164 It also
fails the first prong of the nominative fair use test which requires
that the product or service not be readily identifiable without the
trademark.165 For example, Google does not need to refer to every
trademark used within Adword’s code to describe its function or
purpose—the contextual advertising service and the technical
underpinnings behind it are completely distinct.
These fair use exceptions clearly were not established with
non-source identifying trademark use in mind, and will not provide
a defense against the initially confused. This is not surprising
because what constitutes trademark use in commerce online has
been broadened from the doctrine’s offline counterpart. As the
162

A recent survey suggests that Web users are still not particularly adept at
distinguishing unbiased search results and paid advertising. See WIRED.COM, at
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,66374,00.html (Jan. 23, 2005) (“[O]nly 38
percent of web searchers even know of the distinction [between unbiased and paid
advertising], and of those, not even half —47 percent—say they can always tell which are
paid. That comes out to only 18 percent of all web searchers knowing when a link is
paid.”).
163
See supra Part II.A.3.
164
Classic fair use is trademark use that only describes the good or service of the party
accused of infringement. See supra Part II.A.3.
165
See supra Part II.A.3.
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Charter Club and Calvin Klein hypothetical demonstrates, nonsource identifying use in commerce is nonsensical in the brickand-mortar world.166 Therefore, any fair use exceptions to nonsource identifying use will be inapposite because such use should
not be considered actionable in the first place.
C. How Much Goodwill Does it Take to Click an Ad?
The Brookfield analogy has been heavily criticized as being
inapplicable to the realities of the Internet. According to the court
in Bihari v. Gross,
The harm caused by a misleading billboard on the highway is
difficult to correct. In contrast, on the information superhighway,
resuming one’s search for the correct website is relatively simple.
With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can
return to the search engine’s results and resume searching for the
original website.167
Supporters of the billboard analogy may argue that liability
under the Lanham Act should not be contingent on how convenient
it is for a consumer to resume his or her initial search. The
misappropriation of goodwill should not be excused online, but
punished elsewhere. However, the difference in the relative
hardship between driving back onto the highway versus clicking
the browser back button is relevant. Because clicking back and
forth between links, webpages, and other browser windows is so
effortless, the decision to click a pop-up or banner advertisement
does not usually give rise to the same level of conscious decisionmaking that exiting a highway does. Clicking on a hyperlink takes
about as much exertion as changing the television station with a
remote control. Conversely, most individuals do not casually exit
a highway without good reason.
Therefore, affording a competitor with “crucial credibility
during the initial phases of the deal,” may not depend upon the
misappropriation of anything besides screen space.168 If courts
continue to insist that use in commerce does not have to be either
166
167
168

See supra Part II.A.
119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
See supra note 61.
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source-identifying169 or cognizable to the ordinarily prudent
purchaser,170 the initial interest confusion inquiry should at least
acknowledge the realities of Web browsing habits and assess
whether it is misappropriated goodwill or merely halfhearted
clicking that diverts potential customers. Trademark law should
only be interested in policing the former.
D. Why the Metatag Cases Properly Adapt the Lanham Act to the
Internet
It is worth noting that the metatag cases are distinguishable
from the banner ad and pop-up cases because of what metatags are:
code describing the contents of a webpage that “serve[s] as a
cataloging system for a search engine.”171 Therefore, using a
competitor’s trademark in a metatag is the online equivalent of an
independent video rental store posting a “Blockbuster” sign in its
window.172 Because this is actionable in the brick-and-mortar
world, it should be actionable online.173
Consider the Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.
case where Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc. (“RMD”) copied
Niton’s metatags verbatim.174 As a result, entering the phrase
“home page of Niton Corporation” on a search engine generated a
query results list that included more of RMD’s websites than
Niton’s.175 The trademark use in commerce by RMD was not a
“pure machine linking function,” but did “identify or distinguish
products or services” because this is precisely what metatags do.
Therefore, this was a proper adaptation of the Lanham Act to
metatags; what is illegal offline was held illegal online.

169

See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra Part II.B.2, note 126.
171
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
172
Furthermore, although the trademarks within the metatags are facially hidden like
those in the banner ad and pop-up cases, the use of the trademarks is targeted to and
recognized by the Web user: each website in the query results list claims to be
categorically similar to the user’s trademark search term which is prominently displayed
at the top of the list.
173
Of course, this is actionable only upon a showing of likelihood of confusion.
174
See, 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998).
175
Id. at 104.
170
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CONCLUSION
As technology continues to replicate in-person shopping
experiences online, courts should similarly replicate in-person
jurisprudence online. When the legality of trademark use differs
depending upon the underlying technology, courts should query
whether such a result is consistent with the goals of the Lanham
Act.
If courts find actionable trademark use online that is hidden or
lacks a source-identifying function, likelihood of confusion can be
the result of anything, including unfamiliarity with new
technologies. For example, many consumers cannot discern the
difference between paid search engine advertising and unbiased
search results.176 However, consumer confusion regarding how
search engines generate and display results should not be
actionable under the Lanham Act. Unless consumers familiarize
themselves with the underlying technology, they can be genuinely
confused, and as a result, companies like Google will be held to
infringe and competition will be stifled.
Therefore, by adapting the “use in commerce” prerequisite to
the Internet in such a way that it is essentially superfluous, the
ordinarily prudent purchasers take center stage and their initial
confusion can decide cases. This is a reckless departure from wellestablished jurisprudence that could devastate online contextual
advertising and deprive the Web user of brand alternatives. Until
the Supreme Court precludes courts from finding actionable
trademark use that is hidden or has no source-identifying function
whatsoever, consumer confusion resulting from anything except
cognizable trademark use will shut down these ads and the
revenue-generating software programs behind them.

176

See supra note 162.

